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CASE NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Due Process, and Equal Protec-
tion-Price-Anderson Act's $560,000,000 Limit on Liability
From A Nuclear Power Plant Accident Is Unconstitutional.
Carolina Environmental Study Group v. United States Atomic En-
ergy Commission, 431 F. Supp. 203 (W.D.N.C.), cert. granted, 98
S. Ct. 426 (1977).'
Plaintiffs, who live in the vicinity of Charlotte, North Carolina,
contested the constitutionality 'of the Price-Anderson Act,' which
sets a $560,000,000 limit on the aggregate amount that victims of a
nuclear accident may recover.' Two dual reactor atomic turbine
plants are under construction adjacent to the city of Charlotte by
the Duke Power Company,I which joined with the defendants in this
action. Since, in the event of an accident at these facilities the Act's
limit may deny plaintiffs, full compensation,5 plaintiffs obtained a
1. A direct appeal was taken pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1975), since an Act of Congress
was declared unconstitutional and an agent of the United States was a party to the proceed-
ing.
2. Act of Sept. 2, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2210
(1970).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(c) (1970).
4. The Catawba Nuclear Station is sixteen.miles south of Charlotte and the McGuire
Nuclear Stattion is on Lake Norman seventeen miles north of Charlotte (population approxi-
mately 300,000). Carolina Environmental Study Group v. UriitedStates, 431 F. Supp. 203,
206 (W.D.N.C.), cert. granted; 98 S. Ct. 426 (1977).
5. These nuclear power plants pose basically two hazards. Certain areas north of Lake
Norman will reach more than 95 degrees when the one and one half to two million gallons of
water per minute used to cool the reactor is recirculated into the lake. The environmental,
aesthetic and recreational value of the lake will surely diminish. Id. at 208. The Price Ander-
son Act provides a shield to insulate nuclear facilities from liability for the second hazard. In
case of a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) a "core melt" may occur with the potential release
of all accumulated fission products. Each of the McGuire Nuclear Station's reactors contain
about 1,000 times the amount of radioactive material used in the Hiroshima atomic bomb.
Id. at 207.
A 1957 study prepared for the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) hypothesized that a core
melt in a then existing nuclear reactor could result in as many as 3,400 deaths, 43,000 injuries
and as much as $7,000,000,000 in property damage from long term contamination. AEC, THE
THEORETICAL POSSIBILITIES AND CONSEQUENCES OF MAJOR ACCIDENTS IN LARGE NUCLEAR POWER
PLANTS (1957). A summary of these conclusions, by Harold Vance, is included in the Joint
Committee's Report on the Price-Anderson Bill, H.R. REP. No. 435, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 31-
34 (1957).
An updating of the AEC's 1957 study was undertaken in 1965. The results, however, were
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declaration holding the Price-Anderson Act unconstitutional as vio-
lative of due process and equal protection.'
The Price-Anderson Act, passed in 1957, limits the aggregate lia-
bility of utilities and the amount recoverable by those injured in a
nuclear incident' to $560,000,000.8 Duke Power Company is required
never disclosed "presumably to avoid unduly alarming the public." Green, Nuclear Power:
Risk, Liability, and Indemnity, 71 Mich. L. Rev. 479, (1973). A commissioner of the AEC did
refer to the 1965 study by stating "that seven years after the first study, one is considering
theoretically conceivable accidents in a reactor which is considerably larger than in 1957,
located somewhat closer to population centers, with the confidence of increased operating
experience and constantly improving designs and engineering safeguards. Id. at 493. In 1965,
the Chairman of the AEC further stated that "assuming the same kind of hypothetical
accidents as those in the 1957 study, the theoretically calculated damages would not be less
and under some circumstances would be substantially more than the consequences reported
in the earlier study (of $7,000,000,000 in property damage alone)." Hearings before the Sub-
committee on Legislation of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on Proposed Extension
of A.E.C. Indemnity Legislation, 89th Cong. 1st Sess. 347-48 (1965). The Commissioner
further stated that the "probability of catastrophe is exceedingly low, even lower than our
estim ate of the remote probability of such an event in 1957 ... We cannot say, however, that
the likelihood is non-existent." Id. at 348. As the possibility of such an accident is undisputed,
the probability that $560,000,000 would not cover the consequent damages is equally obvious.
6. The Carolina court held that the Act violated due process for two reasons: because it
limits a common law right of action without providing for a compensatory benefit to those
whose rights have been limited (no quid pro quo) and because the Act permits the destruction
of life and property without reasonable certainty of just compensation. The court also held
that the Act violated equal protection because it irrationally and arbitrarily burdens those
least able to shoulder the damages in the event of a nuclear accident. Carolina Environmental
Study Group v. United States, 431 F. Supp. 203, 222-25 (W.D.N.C.), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct.
426 (1977).
A representative of Duke admitted that the company's continued participation in the
nuclear energy field was contingent upon the Price-Anderson Act. Id. at 218. Once shown that
the Act is the sine qua non of nuclear plant construction, any injury, however slight, caused
by the building of these plants gives rise to standing to challenge the Act. See Sellers v.
Friedrich Refrigerators, Inc., 283 N.C. 79, 194 S.E.2d 817 (1973). The Carolina court deemed
the present threat of "having to make the Hobson's choice of moving away or living with the
constant and present fear of future catastrophe" was sufficient injury to constitute standing.
431 F. Supp. at 221. The court also noted, as an equitable matter, that it may be too late to
challenge the Act's constitutionality if the plaintiff's are to wait until a reactor accident
occurs. Id. at 226.
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2210(a), 2210(c) (1970). A "nuclear incident" is defined to include any
personal injury or property damage resulting from exposure to radiation. 42 U.S.C. § 2014(a)
(1970).
8. In recognition that this amount may prove insufficient to compensate victims of a
nuclear accident, Congress further provided: "That in the event of a nuclear incident involv-
ing damages in excess of that amount of aggregate liability, the Congress will thoroughly
review the particular incident and will take whatever action is deemed necessary and appro-
priate to protect the public from the consequences of a disaster of such magnitude." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2210(e) (1970).
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to carry the maximum amount of private insurance available The
balance of the $560,000,000 liability not covered by private sources
is assumed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (formerly the
Atomic Energy Commission), under an idemnification agreement.'"
If a court decides that claims may exceed the mandated limit, the
$560,000,000 is distributed among the claimants on a pro rata basis
with due regard to latent injury claims that may later be filed."
The Price-Anderson Act is one of Congress' most ambitious at-
tempts at providing protection from liability outside the workmen's
compensation field.'" An analogous limitation on liability is the re-
9. Reactors producing 100,000 electrical kilowatts or more must carry the maximum
amount of private insurance available. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(b) (1970). Each of the reactors at
the McGuire Nuclear Station will produce approximately 1,180,000 kilowatts. 431 F. Supp.
at 206. Private insurance groups now offer a maximum of $125,000,000 liability protection per
nuclear facility. N.Y.L.J., Jan. 23, 1978, p. 24.
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(c) (1970). Considering the $125,000,000 available from private
sources, the federal government would, at most, be required to contribute $435,000,000 in the
event of an accident. The government charges nuclear facilities a fee for providing such
insurance which is, at its highest, thirty dollars per year per thousand kilowatts generated
and at least one hundred dollars a year. 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (f) (1970). In 1975, Congress
amended the Price-Anderson Act to promote greater financial responsibility by industry
within the $560,000,000 limit. In the event of a nuclear incident causing damage in excess of
the private insurance available, the government is authorized to charge a "standard deferred
premium" against all nuclear facilities obliged to carry the maximum private insurance. This
deferred premium may be as much as $5,000,000, for each facility, with the government
guaranteeing payment for those facilities that default. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(b) (Supp. V 1975).
The aggregate of the deferred premium plus the amount covered by private sources shall in
no event exceed the $560,000,000 limit. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(c) (1970).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(o) (1970).
12. But see Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America v. Pan American Airways, 58 F. Supp.
338, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1944), where the court upheld the Warsaw Convention's limitation on
liability for airplane accidents, stating: "The argument that the treaty is invalid because it
deprives the plaintiff of its property without due process is rejected. Statutes for the limita-
tion of liability are no novelty." The Carolina court distinguished the Warsaw Convention
case by stating: "[Tireaties with other countries [do not] follow the same rules as lawsuits
or ordinary Acts of Congress." 431 F. Supp. 203, 224. This statement is difficult to reconcile
with the fact that treaties also are bound by the parameters of equal protection and due
process. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957). See also Carr v. United States, 422 F.2d 1007 (4th
Cir. 1970) upholding the Federal Drivers Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d) (1970), which abrogates
the common law right of suing an individual tortfeasor if the tortfeasor is a government driver
acting in the scope of his employ. The sole remedy for such negligence is to sue the Federal
Government under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1970). However, if the
plaintiff is a federal government employee injured in an activity incident to service he is
denied permission to sue the government. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950). If the
plaintiff is so unlucky as to be a serviceman injured by a tortfeasor covered by the Federal
Drivers Act, he is denied a right to sue altogether. Thomason v. Sanchez, 398 F. Supp. 500
(D.N.J. 1975).
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cent trend among state legislatures to limit the damages recoverable
in medical malpractice actions. Twenty-one states have passed such
legislation 3 and conflicting case law concerning the constitution-
ality of these statutes is now being generated. 4
The Carolina court relied on N. Y Central R.R. Co. v. Whitel' in
deciding that due process requires a quid pro quo, or an exchange
of benefits, when a common law right of action is limited by the
legislature." This leading Supreme Court case, upholding the con-
stitutionality of workmen's compensation, stated in dictum that "it
perhaps may be doubted whether the state could abolish all rights
of action, on the one hand, or all defenses, on the other, without
setting up something adequate in their stead."' 7 Other federal au-
thorities'" when deciding the constitutionality of legislative limita-
tions on common law rights of action, have rejected the idea that
due process requires a quid pro quo.
The Supreme Court, in holding that the Federal Employees Lia-
bility Act superseded the immutability of common law rights,
quoted from Munn v. Illinois" to the effect that
[a] person has no property, no vested interest in any rule of the common
law . . .Rights of property which have been created by the common law
cannot be taken away without due process; but the law itself as a rule of
conduct, may be changed at the will ... of the legislature, unless prevented
by constitutional limitations.2"
See also Murray v. New York Central R.R. Co., 287 F.2d 152, cert. denied, 366 U.S. 945
(1961), upholding the Limitation of Vessel Owner's Liability Statute, 46 U.S.C. §§ 181-96
(1970), which limits a vessel owner's liability for acts not caused by his own negligence to
the value of his interest in the ship plus the value of the ship's cargo.
13. American Insurance Association, Medical Malpractice Insurance Reports (1976). See
e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 39-4204 (Supp. 1975) ($250,000); IDAHO CODE § 39-4204 (Supp. 1975)
($150,000); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 70, § 101 (Smith-Hurd 1975) ($500,000); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-
9.5-2-2(b) (Burns Supp. 1975) ($500,000); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.42(B)(1) (1975)
($500,000); NEa. REV. STAT. §§ 44-2801 to 44-2855 (Supp. 1976) ($500,000); 1975 N.D. SESS.
LAWS ch. 264, § 11 ($500,000); OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2307.43 (Baldwin 1975) ($200,000);
OREGON LAWS ch. 796 P. 2316 ($500,000).
14. Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976); Wright v. Central
DuPage Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976); Pendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb.
97, 256 N.W.2d 657 (1977); Simon v. St. Elizabeth Med. Center, 3 Ohio Op. 3d 164, 355
N.E.2d 903 (1976); Oregon Med. Ass'n. v. Rawls, 276 Or. 1101, 557 P.2d 664 (1976).
15. 243 U.S. 188 (1917).
16. 431 F. Supp. at 223.
17. 243 U.S. 188 (1917).
18. See notes 17, 19, supra and 21, 23, 24 infra.
19. 94 U.S. 113, 114 (1876).
20. Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 223 U.S. 1, 50 (1912). Although Munn dealt
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In the Arizona Employers Liability Cases2' the Court elaborated
further, stating that: "[common law tort rules] are not placed, by
the Fourteenth Amendment, beyond the reach of the state's power
to alter them, as rules of future conduct and test of responsibility,
through legislation designed to promote the public welfare.""2
The requirement of a quid pro quo that the White case suggested
in dictum should have been entirely dispelled after the Supreme
Court stated in Silver v. Silver23 "the rule that the Constitution does
not forbid the creation of new rights and the abolition of old ones
recognized by the common law, to attain a permissable legislative
object." 4 In Carr v. United States" the Fourth Circuit cited this
quote from Silver in holding that the complete abrogation of a com-
mon law right of action did not require the creation of some new
benefit as a quid pro quo."8 Finally, the Fifth Circuit," in upholding
a workmen's compensation statute quoted Munn's statement that
a person has no property interest in any common law2" and elabo-
rated further that "one cannot be heard to question the sufficiency
of due process if the rule of law, which merely held the potential to
create a property right, was changed before any right vested... The
abolition of non-vested rights is especially innocuous if, as here, one
remedy is substituted for another. 28 The idea of a quid pro quo
requirement for due process is best considered "nothing more than
a make-weight argument." 0
Some state courts, in deciding the analogous limitation on recov-
ery mandated by state medical malpractice ceilings, agree with the
constitutional interpretation of the Carolina court that a quid pro
with state regulation of commercial interest, the quote here was used to uphold the supremacy
of workmen's compensation over the common law.
21. 250 U.S. 400 (1919).
22. Id. at 421.
23. 280 U.S. 117 (1929) (upholding automobile guest statutes against due process attack
even though these statute abrogate simple negligence as a cause of action for invitee passen-
gers).
24. Id. at 122.
25. 422 F.2d 1007 (4th Cir. 1970). See also Thomason v. Sanchez, 398 F. Supp. 500 (D.N.J.
1975).
26. See note 12 supra.
27. Keller v. Dravo Corp., 441 F.2d 1239 (5th Cir. 1971).
28. See notes 17 and 18 supra.
29. Keller v. Dravo Corp., 441 F.2d 1239, 1242 (5th Cir. 1971).
30. Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399, 401 (1976).
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quo is an essential component of due process. The supreme courts
of Illinois:" and Ohio" both struck down limitations on malpractice
recoveries as violating due process, since those injured by the limita-
tion on recoverable damages were not given a compensatory benefit
in exchange for surrendering their right to full recovery. 3 The Illi-
nois court distinguished that state's medical malpractice limitation
from the limitation on recoverable damages that workmen's com-
pensation imposes by stating: "The Workmen's Compensation Act
provided a quid pro quo in that the employer assumed a new liabil-
ity without fault but was relieved of the prospect of large damage
judgments, while the employee, whose monetary recovery was lim-
ited, was awarded compensation without regard to the employer's
negligence."3 The malptactice victim on the other hand, must
prove the same degree of liability and be subject to the same defen-
ses while he "might be unable to recover all the medical expenses
he might incur . . ."
Jones v. State Board of Medicine,3" however, expressly rejected
the proposition that due process requires an exchange of benefits
when a right of action is limited.37 The Idaho Supreme Court in
Jones reversed a finding that the state's limit on medical malprac-
tice recovery was unconstitutional stating: "We agree ... that the
United States Supreme Court in White did not intend to engraft
upon the traditional due process test an additional standard when
the challenged statute involves alteration of some prior existing
common law doctrine. '38
The Price-Anderson Act was deemed to violate due process for a
31. Wright v. Central DuPage Hosp. Ass'n, 63 I1. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976).
32. Simon v. St. Elizabeth Med. Center, 3 Ohio Op. 3d 164, 355 N.E.2d 903 (1976).
33. Wright v. Central DuPage Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736, 742 (1976);
Simon v. St. Elizabeth Med. Center, 3 Ohio Op. 3d 164, 355 N.E.2d 903 (1976).
34. Wright v. Central DuPage Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736, 742 (1976).
35. Id.
36. Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976).
37. Id. at 868, 555 P.2d at 409. New York has also expressly rejected the need for a quid
pro quo to satisfy due process. Montgomery v. Daniels, 38 N.Y.2d 41, 56, 340 N.E.2d 444,
453, 378 N.Y.S.2d 1, 14 (1975). The highest court of New York decided that a $50,000 recovery
limitation imposed by "no fault" insurance was constitutional stating that a "serious ques-
tion exists as to whether this 'adequate substitute test' is any test at all."
38. 97 Idaho 859,868, 555 P.2d 399, 409. See also Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 256
N.W.2d 657, 671 (1977). The Nebraska Supreme Court upheld that state's ceiling on medical
malpractice recovery, flatly stating, "There is no merit to the argument that if a common
law right is to be taken away something must be given in return."
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second reason. The Act contains no "reasonable, certain and ade-
quate provision for obtaining compensation which due process re-
quires." 9 However, the Carolina court seems to be confusing an
eminent domain proceeding with a legislative limitation on a right
of action.4 The court's reliance on the Regional Rail Reorganization
Act Cases4 is misplaced since that opinion dealt with the direct
taking of personal property without provision for compensation.42
The Carolina court also held that the Price-Anderson Act violated
equal protection.43 The court reasoned that the Act was unconstitu-
39. 431 F. Supp. at 224 quoting from Regional Rail Reorganization Cases, 419 U.S. 102,
124-25 (1974).
40. It is interesting to note that this argument is similar to the exchange of benefits
argument in that both would mandate that a form of compensation be given to those whose
recovery is limited by the legislature. However, the "taking" of an unperfected right of action
requires no compensation and cannot be analogized to an eminent domain action.
Even if the Price-Anderson Act's limitation of a right of action could be interpreted as a
taking of a property right, compensation would still not necessarily be required. The regula-
tory authority of the Act is based on the war powers, the commerce clause and the need to
protect the public health and safety. H. R. Rep. No. 2181, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1954); S.
Rep. No. 1699, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1954); 42 U.S.C. § 2012(c) (1970). Under the war and
public welfare powers a much more immediate invasion of property rights has been sanc-
tioned. In United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155 (1958), a prohibition on
the mining of gold was upheld under the war powers because "the mere fact that the regula-
tion deprives the property owner of the most profitable use of his property is not necessary
to establish the owner's right to compensation." Id. at 168. In an emergency such as a tree
blight, the destruction of private property does not rquire compensation. Miller v. Schane,
276 U.S. 272 (1928). Of course, a factual question remains whether the energy crisis is an
emergency of the requisite magnitude.
41. Regional Rail Reorganization Cases, 419 U.S. 102 (1974).
42. Plaintiffs, who had an interest in the bankrupt Penn Central Railroad, objected to the
compelled continuation of rail operation while a final plan for the governmental ownership
was being formulated. The plaintiffs asserted that accrual of post-bankruptcy claims with
priority over the plaintiffs' claims would operate as an erosion of the plaintiffs' interest. Id.
at 124.
43. 431 F. Supp. 203, 225. Equal protection analysis traditionally uses one of two tests. If
the classification involves a suspect class, such as race, or a fundamental right, such a
religion, then the statutory classification would be subjected to a strict scrutiny test. The
statutory discrimination would be upheld only if it served a compelling state interest and was
the least restrictive means available for achieving that interest. See Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618 (1969) (fundamental right to travel); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (race
as a suspect classification).
The second tier of equal protection scrutiny applies to most non-suspect classification,
including the regulation of business and industry. By this rational basis test a statutory
discrimination will not be set aside if there is any reasonable basis upon which to justify it.
See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
In practice, this two tier system means that there may be no statutory discrimination within
the first tier on almost any basis while if there is no justifying rationale for the classifications
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tional on this basis because the liability limitation irrationally bur-
dens those who happen to live in the area of the plant, those injured
people least able to afford the damage and because a better method
could be devised to achieve the statute's purpose."
State courts have applied conflicting equal protection tests in
deciding the analogous liability limitations on medical malpractice.
The Ohio Supreme Court in Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical
Center '5 applied a compelling governmental interest test to strike
down that state's limitation." The Illinois Supreme Court in Wright
v. Central DuPage Hospital Ass'n47 used a rational basis test to find
a $500,000 limit on malpractice damages unconstitutional." The
following year, in Prendergast v. Nelson," the Nebraska Supreme
Court used the same equal protection test to achieve an opposite
result. There the court upheld a $500,000 limits saying: "despite the
fact that in practice its laws may result in some inequality, we will
not set aside a statutory discrimination if any state of facts reasona-
bly exists to justify it." Oregon's supreme court reversed and re-
manded a decision upholding the constitutionaity of that state's
limit,5" while Idaho's supreme court took the same action with a
lower court's holding that the statute was unconstitutional." Both
cases appeared to be applying a middle tier equal protection test.
The Oregon court quoted from the Idaho case to the effect that:
"It is thus impossible for this Court to assess the necessity for this
legislation and whether or not the limitations . . .bear a fair and
within the lower tier, the court will supply one by using its imagination. See generally
Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court. A Model for a Newer Equal Proiection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1972) (herein-
after Gunther). The Supreme Court has also created various intermediate or middle tier
approaches which require more than a rational basis but less than a compelling reason. Under
these approaches, the Court will balance the state interest advanced against the right inter-
fered with. These tests have been utilized when classifications of sex and illegitimacy have
been involved. See Matthews v. Lucas, 96 S. Ct. 2755 (1976); weinberger v. Wisenfeld, 420
U.S. 636 (1975); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677 (1973); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S.
71 (1971). For a thorough discussion of the intermediate approaches, see Gunther, supra.
45. 3 Ohio Op. 3d 164, 355 N.E.2d 903, 911 (1976).
46. Id. at 171, 355 N.E.2d at 911.
47. Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Il1. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736, 743 (1976).
48. Id.
49. 199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d.657 (1977).
50. Oregon Med. Ass'n v. Rawls, 276 Or: 1101, 557 P.2d 664, 669 (1976).
51. Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976).
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substantial relationship to the asserted purpose of the Act."5 Medi-
cal malpractice liability limits are patently for the purpose of eco-
nomic or social welfare. The Supreme Court has held that if this is
the case, "A statutory discrimination may not be set aside if any
state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it."53 State
courts, however, are experiencing difficulties applying a traditional
rational basis test to liability limits.
Both the Carolina court and many state courts considering liabil-
ity limiting statutes strain to apply stricter equal protection ana-
lyses and attempt to engraft a quid pro quo requirement to due
process. The equities in disputes concerning limitations on malprac-
tice recoveries, as under the Price-Anderson Act limitation, lie with
the potentially undercompensated victim. Finding a way to reflect
this in applicable legal concepts, without adding additional require-
ments to due process or doing too much damage to the existing
principles of equal protection, was the challenge the Carolina court
faced.
The preponderance of prior case law rejects the requirement of an
exchange of benefits, or quid pro quo component to due process
when a common law right of action is limited."4 Many of these cases,
however, relate to limitations on recovery imposed by workmen's
compensation statutes.5 The distinction between workmen's com-
pensation statutes on. the one hand and the Price-Anderson Act or
malpractice damage limits on the other, is that the purpose of work-
men's compensation was to remove the formidable barriers prevent-
ing just compensation for victims of industrial injuries," whereas
the Price-Anderson Act and malpractice damage limitations are
addressed at protecting the nuclear power industry and the medical
profession, by compelling the undercompensated tort victim to
shoulder the societal costs of that protection. While this is a sympa-
thetic case for the application of the quid pro quo requirement,57 it
would hinder the progress of all law to so sanctify the common law
rules that a surrender of all or part of them to the legislature yields
52. 97 Idaho at 873, 555 P.2d at 413-14, quoted at 276 Or. at 1106, 557 P.2d at 669.
53. Mc. Gowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 421, 426 (1961).
54. See notes 45-53 supra.
55. But see notes 23-24 and accompanying text supra.
56. See W. PossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF ToUTs, (4th ed. 1971), at 525-34.
57. But it is certainly no more sympathetic a case than Thomason. See note 12 supra.
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the due process right to demand a substitutionary benefit. The Su-
preme Court clearly precluded the imposition of such absolute stric-
tures upon legislative action in Munn v. Illinois" by stating that:
"(The common law) is only one of the forms of municipal law, and
is no more sacred than any other ... Indeed, the great office of
statutes is to remedy defects in the common law as they are devel-
oped, and to adapt it to the changes of time and circumstances.""5
Even assuming the existence of a quid pro quo or exchange of
benefits component to due process, the Price-Anderson Act proba-
bly would meet the test. The instant case held that there could be
no exchange of benefits and burdens since, in the event of an acci-
dent, the utility operating the nuclear facility would almost cer-
tainly be held to strict liability as an ultra-hazardous activity.'"
However, the Act not only provides a waiver of the defense of due
care, but also mandates a twenty year statute of limitations and a
denial of the assumption of the risk defense." These provisions may
constitute a satisfactory exchange for the limited liability that the
Price-Anderson Act allows utilities to enjoy. Waiver of assumption
of risk would benefit the victims of a nuclear accident since this
defense might apply against all those who move into the area after
the reactor is functioning.2 An extended statute of limitations is
valuable to the potential plaintiffs due to the peculiar nature of
nuclear injuries such as leukemia, thyroid cancer and genetic muta-
tion which take many years to become manifest. 3
Equal protection guarantees provide the most flexible vehicle to
protect the rights of the undercompensated. Even in this area, how-
ever, prior cases tend to support the constitutionality of statutes
limiting liability. The purpose of the Price-Anderson Act's limita-
58. 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
59. Id. at 134.
60. 431 F. Supp. at 223-24. Trull v. Carolina-Virginia Well Co., 264 N.C. 687, 142 S.E.2d
622 (1965), states that with an "ultrahazardous activity" North Carolina follows the rule of
Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R., 3 H.L. 330 (1868), by imposing liability in the event of an accident
upon the one who brought the hazard into the community regardless of due care.
61. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(1) (1970).
62. McClung v. Louisville & N. Ry. Co., 225 Ala. 302, 51 So. 2d 371 (1951). By the plaintiff
voluntarily choosing a place to live, with knowledge of the risk, he assumes the risk.
63. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1,15(b) (1971) provides for a discovery doctrine. Those defects or
injuries not readily apparent at the time of origin are deemed to have accrued at the time of
discovery, but no longer than ten years from the time of the incident causing the injury. The
Price-Anderson Act provides for a twenty-year discovery doctrine.
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tion on liability is an economic one, to stimulate the growth and
development of nuclear energy by inducing the investment of pri-
vate industry." As with statutes limiting medical malpractice dam-
ages, there appears to be a patently rational relationship between
the Act and the legislative purpose. By traditional equal protection
analysis it is established that "[i]n the area of economics and social
welfare" equal protection is not violated "merely because the classi-
fications made by its laws are imperfect." 5 Nor is a statute uncon-
stitutional because it "is not made with mathematical nicety or
because in practice it results in some inequality.""0 Also, if a ra-
tional basis test is being applied the method chosen to achieve the
legislature's purpose need not be the best alternative. It need only
be rationally related to that purpose. 7
The Carolina court could not be applying a rational basis test
since, if it were, a "state of facts reasonably may be conceived to
justify it."" When the court speaks of the limitation as being
"unnecessary to serve any legitimate purpose" 9 it is using a middle
tier scrutiny to balance the legislative interest advanced against the
right interfered with.7 Although this is a novel test to apply in the
area of economic legislation,7 it is clear that the courts, as well as
legislatures,72 are uncomfortable with legislative fiats that deny
64. S. REP. No. 1699, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1954); H.R. RFP. No. 2181, 83rd Cong., 2d
Sess. 3 (1954).
65. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,485 (1970). In the Carolina case, as in Dandridge,
there is no allegation of racial or religious discrimination which would require a compelling
governmental interest to justify the legislation. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
The Dandridge Court recognized that the application of a rational basis test has
in the main involved state regulation of business or industry. The administration of
public welfare assistance, by contrast, involves the most basic economic needs of
impoversished human beings. We recognize the dramatically real factual differences
between the cited cases and this one, but we can find no basis for applying a different
constitutional standard. 397 U.S. at 485.
66. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911).
67. Williamson v. Fortson, 376 F. Supp. 1300 (N.D. Ga. 1974).
68. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 421, 426 (1961).
69. 431 F. Supp. at 225.
70. See note 37 supra.
71. Two of the five cases considering the constitutionality of limits on medical malprac-
tice damages have also applied middle tier ,equal protection scrutiny. Jones v. State Bd. of
Med. 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399, 411 (1976); Oregon Med. Ass'n v. Rawls, 276 Or. 1101, 557
P.2d 664, 669 (1976).
72. See note 7 supra. Section 2210(e) of the Price Anderson Act provides that if the kind
of catastrophic accident against which the Act protects utilities occurs, Congress is to override
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plaintiff's common law right to full compensation merely upon the
showing of any rational justification.
A middle tier of equal protection scrutiny, such as the Carolina
court suggest it is applying, provides a flexible tool to ensure that
the legislative interest advanced is worth the sacrifice of these plain-
tiff's common law claim to full compensation. This test is also capa-
ble of reflecting the equities of the undercompensated without per-
verting established principles of equal protection or creating addi-
tional requirements to due process. A balancing of the legislative
interest advanced against the right interfered with obviates the need
for a quid pro quo requirement since any benefit given in return for
a limitation on a right of action would be considered in determining
the extent of interference with that right. The existence of a quid
pro quo would thereby make the discriminatory statute less offen-
sive under a middle tier scrutiny.
Existing principles of equal protection also would not be under-
mined by this intermediate test. Established liability limiting stat-
utes, such as workmen's compensation, would be left standing, not
only because of the significant governmental interest advanced, but
also because the plaintiff's right to compensation is not interfered
with since the purpose of workmen's compensation was to remove
obstacles to recovery.
While the Price-Anderson Act may be one of the simpler means
of inducing private industry to invest in nuclear power, the alloca-
tion of the program's cost must be examined in the light of basic
fairness. The Supreme Court of Idaho accomplished this with re-
spect to medical malpractice damage limitations by applying a mid-
dle tier equal protection analysis. The court recognized that while
"legislation should be upheld so long as its actions can reasonably
be said to promote the health, safety and welfare of the public...
where the discriminatory character of a challenged classification is
apparent on its face .. .then a more stringent inquiry is required
beyond that mandated by McGowen."73 Although the statutory pur-
the Act and take "whatever action is deemed necessary." New York "no-fault" insurance
exempts from that statute's liability limit those who are "seriously injured." N.Y. INs. LAW
§ 671(4) (McKinney 1976).
73. Jones v. State Bd. of Med., 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399, 411 (1976). An explanation of
the Idaho court's willingness to use a middle tier equal protection analysis may be that the
Idaho court was reversed by the United States Supreme Court in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71
(1971), a landmark case in the establishment of intermediate equal protection scrutiny. In
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pose of providing electric energy is socially beneficial and legiti-
mate, the means employed-forcing those who live near nuclear
reactors to pay for the plant's construction by shouldering the entire
risk concomitant with nuclear energy-is patently unfair.
It is doubtful that the Price-Anderson Act will withstand the
constitutional scrutiny of a middle tier equal protection analysis if
such as test is applied on appeal. The right to full compensation is
a significant one, based on the fundamental tort law principle that
the one who causes the harm is under a duty to fully compensate
those injured.74 Another consideration causing the scales of this mid-
dle tier scrutiny to weigh against the constitutionality of the Price-
Anderson Act is that other, less onerous means could be employed
to ensure full compensation while still encouraging participation in
the nuclear power industry. As the Carolina court suggested, the
institution of an industrywide liability pool or an outright govern-
ment guarantee to cover the cost of nuclear accidents75 would be
more equitable alternatives to making those most injured by nuclear
accidents go uncompensated.
Michael L. Fitzgerald
that case, the Idaho court used a rational basis test to uphold a statutory presumption that
fathers, rather than mothers, should manage their child's estate. The United State Supreme
Court reversed, holding that the justification for the discrimination, administrative conveni-
ence, was not a "fair and substantial" enough legislative interest to justify the presumption.
Id. at 76
74. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, (4th ed. 1971) at 6, 16-23.
75. 431 F. Supp. at 225.
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